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Abstract 
 
As global trade and business activities intensified, cross-national patenting 
activities have been playing an increasingly important role in the process of 
innovation accumulation and growth. However, few studies (to my knowledge) have 
examined the characteristics of cross-national patents and their relationship to the 
accumulation and growth of innovation, especially in the context of a developing 
versus a developed country.  
Motivated by the anecdotal evidence and ‘Patent Signaling Theory’ (Spence, 
1973), I investigate the possible influential factors on the ‘quality’ of a US patent with 
a Chinese priority1 (thereafter ‘US-CN’ patent) and their impact on the growth of 
follow-on innovation. By developing and analyzing a unique dataset of 4490 U.S. and 
                                                        
1 In patent, a priority right or right of priority is a time-limited right, triggered by the first filing of an application 
for a patent. The priority right belongs to the applicant or his successor in title and allows him to file a subsequent 
application in another country for the same invention, design or trademark and benefit, for this subsequent 
application, from the date of filing of the first application for the examination of certain requirements. When filing 
the subsequent application, the applicant must "claim the priority" of the first application in order to make use of 
the right of priority. 
Chinese patent matched pair from both U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
and State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO), this study investigates the impact of 
patent strength, patent scope, cross-national inventors, multinational assignees and 
strength of intellectual property rights (IPR) regime on the growth of innovation in the 
U.S. The data set consists of patents that are first filed in China, a developing country 
with uncertain IPR, and subsequently filed and patented in the U.S., a developed 
country with a mature economy and strong IPR protection.  
I employ the negative binomial regression model and find that the number of 
patent claims, patent classes, cross-national inventors and of multinational assignees 
have a significant and positive impact on the forward citations2 of the focal patents. I 
also find that developing a patented innovation under a strong IPR regime does not 
necessarily increase its follow-on use and innovations as proxied by its forward 
citations. This work has significant management implications for firm strategies and 
technology competitiveness especially domestic firms and multinational corporations 
with activities across national boundaries. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
2 A citation is a reference to a published or unpublished source. The backward citations of a patent identify its 
antecedents (original patent which it builts upon) and the forward citations identify the subsequent patents which 
builts upon it. Forward citations link the relationship between an original patent and subsequent technological 
developments which build upon it (i.e. its descendants) 
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1. Introduction  
Technology plays a key role in determining productivity and economic growth 
(Easterly and Levine, 2001; Hall and Jones, 1999; Prescott, 1998). As global trade 
and business activities intensified, cross-national patenting activities have been 
playing an increasingly important role in the process of accumulation and growth of 
innovation, gaining attentions from firms and scholars alike.  
According to the ‘capabilities theory of the firm’ (Langlois, 1992), firms are 
becoming increasingly dependent on their ability to establish a presence at an 
increasing number of locations to access new knowledge and capabilities (Dunning, 
1997; Kuemmerle, 1997). Kuemmerle (1999a) also remarked that the ‘capability 
exploiting motive for foreign direct investment (FDI) in R&D has long been the 
dominant view, in international business literature, to characterize the nature of 
expatriate technological activities. However, Most of the past literature focused only 
on the technology inflow from developed countries to developing countries. For 
example, Singh (2006) argues that in technologically advanced countries, knowledge 
outflow to foreign MNCs greatly outweighs knowledge inflows. Lapan and Bardhan 
(1973) commented that the domestic firms in developing countries might actually 
have less rather than more to gain in knowledge diffusion from MNCs because their 
technology might become too advanced to have direct applicability for these firms. 
However, few scholars have studied the technology flows from a developing country 
to a more developed country. 
Cross-national patenting activities from developing countries to developed 
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countries are growing rapidly nowadays. From 1995 to 2004, the number of U.S. 
patents obtained by U.S. firms based on technologies developed in non-OECD 
countries has more than doubled. In 2007, the overseas Chinese patent applications 
have reached 5401, ranked 7th closely after US, Japan, Germany, France, Korea and 
UK. The increasing Chinese overseas patenting activities are also gaining importance 
in the world’s technological stage. On April 2008, a Chinese electronic firm, Netacin, 
announced their success in the litigation of patent infringement against the second 
biggest mobile storage vendor in the US—PNY. Netacin ended up granting a 
licensing agreement to PNY, setting the first example of Chinese firm profiting from 
overseas licensing.  
Although Chinese overseas patent applications have increased dramatically and 
are now playing an important role in the global technology innovation, it is much 
under-investigated and poorly understood. For a long time, certain attributes of 
patents have been an important research issue among scholars. Motivated by the 
model developed by Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999), the value and technological 
importance (‘quality’) of a patented innovation can be revealed by a set of four 
indicators: the number of patent claims, forward citations, backward citations and 
patent family size. I decided to investigate the possible influential factors on the 
‘quality’ of a US patent with Chinese priority (thereafter ‘US-CN’ patent) and their 
impact on the growth of follow-on innovation. By creating a unique dataset through 
matching 4490 U.S. patents from U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) with 
their corresponding Chinese priorities from State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO), 
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this paper will investigate the impact of certain patent characteristics, namely, patent 
strength, patent scope, inventor countries and assignee countries on the growth of 
innovation in the context of cross-national patenting activities, especially when the 
patent is filed first in a developing country (China) with more uncertain intellectual 
property rights (IPR), then in a mature and bigger foreign market (The United States).   
This paper contributes new insights in the following ways: First, it attempts to 
fill in the research gap to understand a representative sample of matched domestic and 
foreign filing of essentially the same patent and examined their overall impact. For 
example, Allred and Park (2007) investigate the relationship between patent strength 
and international innovation diffusion. They find that for developing economies, 
patent strength negatively affects domestic patent filings but does not significantly 
affects R&D and foreign patent filings. However, they did not examine the 
relationship between the matched domestic and foreign patent counterpart. Second, by 
focusing on the Chinese overseas patenting activities in US, this paper will provide 
new insights of the impact of a developing country’s research capability on the 
technological innovation of a more developed country.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
related theories and literature and proposes a set of empirical predictions. Section 3 
describes the data and measures. Empirical design and method is offered in Section 4, 
while Section 5 presents our empirical results. A final section discusses the results and 
limitations of the study. 
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2. Theory and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Growth of innovation 
We use the patent citations made by each patent to identify its antecedents 
(backward citations), and the subsequent patents that cite it to identify its descendents 
(forward citations). Forward citations link the relationship between an original patent 
and subsequent technological developments which build upon it (i.e. its descendants) 
(Trajtenberg, M., Henderson, R., & Jaffe, A. B, 1997). 
It is common practice to use data from a single patent granting country like the 
U.S. (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002) or the U.K. (Lerner, 2002) to standardize the 
measure of innovation. According to Trajtenberg (1990), Harhoff et al. (1999) and 
Hall et al. (2005), the number of citations a patent receives serves a good indicator of 
its importance In addition, patent forward citation is considered one of the most 
traceable artifacts of knowledge flows (Jaffe et al, 2000), both within and across 
firms’ global R&D networks. Singh (2006) also argues that since existing innovations 
provide ideas and inspiration for further innovation, patent citations help capture 
knowledge flows across organizations. Recent studies comparing citation data with 
direct surveys of inventors show that the correlation between patent citations and 
actual knowledge flows is high, although it is not perfect (Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2005, 
Duguet and MacGarvie 2005). So, in this paper, I employ number of forward citations 
as a measure for the growth of innovation (follow-on research) based on the US-CN 
patents. 
In principle, patents conform well to Spence’s original conceptualization of 
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asignal (Spence, 1973): they are costly to obtain and, through the government 
certification process, provide a mechanism by which the quality of innovative 
activities can be sorted. The examination process is designed to provide a certification 
function through the rejection of inventions that fail to meet the standards required for 
patentability (novel inventions that are useful and not obvious to those skilled in the 
art). Certain features of a grant patent may reveal the importance and value of this 
innovation. At the same time, follow-on researcher may also judge the ‘quality’ of a 
grant patent by these important features, thus certain kind of grant patents tend to be 
of greater importance for follow-on innovation (i.e. have more forward citations). In 
this paper, I attempt to examine the impact different ‘signals’ exhibited by a granted 
patent on further adoption and use by follow-on innovations especially in the context 
of Chinese innovations. The patents in the dataset are first filed in China and then in 
U.S., implying that this innovation is originally developed in China—a developing 
country with weak IPR protection regime. In the following parts of section 2, I will 
investigate four important characters of a granted US-CN patent and discuss their 
relationship with its forward citations separately: (i) patent strength, (ii) patent scope, 
(iii) inventor countries and (iv) assignee countries. By doing so, I hope to understand 
the characteristics of patents created by developing countries and their impact on 
further innovation in developed countries. 
 
2.2 Patent Strength 
The number of claims captures patent strength. A patent consists of a set of 
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claims that delineate what is protected by the patent. The principal claims define the 
essential novel features of the inventions in their broadest form and the subordinate 
claims describe detailed features of the innovation. As such, claims measure the extent 
of the innovation protected by the patent (Harhoff & Reitzig, 2004; Lanjouw & 
Schankerman, 2001). The patentee has an incentive to claim as much as possible in 
the application, but the patent examiner may require that the claims be narrowed 
before granting. Since the number of claims per patent varies widely, using claims 
data might help account for the very large heterogeneity in the value of patents.  
A patent granted with a greater number of claims will increase in royalties that 
may pertain to licensors (Gans, Hsu and Stern, 2008). Lanjouw, Parks and Putnam 
(1998) also find that patent claim is one of the most representative indicators of the 
‘quality’ of innovation. According to Allred and Park (2007), for developed 
economies, patent strength positively affects firm-level research and development 
(R&D). It indicates that if a US-CN patent is assigned more claims by the patent 
examiner, it is probably inferred a relatively higher quality compared to other US 
patents with less claims. Firms and organizations thus may find it more assuring (or 
simply necessary) to cite patents that are of more claims. I therefore predict: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A granted US-CN patent with more claims leads to more subsequent 
innovation adoption (captured by its forward citations). 
 
2.3 Patent Scope 
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Scholars increasingly recognize the scope of patent protection as an important 
public policy instrument. Green and Scotchmer (1990), Scotchmer (1990), Matutes, 
Regibeau, and Rockett (1992) have examined the impact of patent scope on the 
diffusion of innovations and technological collaboration. Austin (1993) examined the 
three-day net-of-market returns around 52 patent awards. For patents assigned to three 
or more IPC classes, he finds that the difference between the returns of the awardees 
and those of the rivals much bigger than narrower patents. Lerner (1994) analyzed the 
impact of patent scope on citations through a regression analysis. He shows that 
patents assigned to more four-digit IPC classes are more likely to be cited in 
subsequent patent documents and to be litigated. In terms of impact of patent scope on 
subsequent knowledge production, Huang and Murray (2009) find that increasing the 
scope of patents deters subsequent public knowledge production (in the context of life 
sciences) and contributes to the anti-commons effect (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998).    
Based on Trajtenberg, Henderson and Jaffe (1997) and Lerner (1994), I employ 
the number of patent classes as a proxy for patent scope. The patent applicant has a 
legal duty to disclose any knowledge of the original patents it built on (antecedents), 
but the decision regarding which patents it should cite ultimately rests with the patent 
examiner. The framework for the examiner’s search of previous innovations is the 
patent classifications system, which consists of over 100, 000 patent subclasses, 
aggregated into about 400 3-digit patent classes. The combination of citation data, 
detailed technological classification, and information about each inventor provides a 
unique mechanism for placing research and research results in their broader 
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technological and economic context (Trajtenberg, Henderson and Jaffe, 1997). Thus, 
if a US-CN patent is to allow broader classes by the patent examiner, it is probably 
considered relatively more innovative and higher quality compared to other US 
patents with less claims. This may also become a patent ‘quality’ signal for the firms 
or organizations in related area. Thus, subsequent innovation adoption may increase 
when a US-CN patent has more patent classes: 
 
Hypothesis 2: A granted US-CN patent with broader patent classes leads to more 
subsequent innovation adoption (captured by its forward citations). 
 
2.4 Cross-national Inventors 
The knowledge-based view argues that firms facilitate interpersonal networks 
and a social context that enable transmission of tacit knowledge over large distances 
(Hedlund, 1986; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Kogut and Zander, 1993; Nohria and 
Ghoshal, 1997). Reagans and McEvily (2003) also argue that the network range, ties 
to different knowledge pools, increases a person's ability to convey complex ideas to 
heterogeneous audiences. Their results indicate that both social cohesion and network 
range ease knowledge transfer, over and above the effect for the strength of the tie 
between two people. Thus, collaboration between inventors from different countries 
probably has an advantage of better knowledge complementation and better 
“resources allocation”. 
The detailed information patents provide also helps in identifying the geographic 
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distribution of human capital utilized by U.S. firms, as well as the collaboration 
among inventors. Reagans and Zuckerman (2001) described how interactions among 
scientists with non-overlapping networks outside of their team improved productivity. 
Collaboration among scientists with different external contacts bridged gaps. Bridging 
structural holes (Burt, 2004) in the external network enabled the scientists to access 
and share with each other diverse knowledge, resulting in greater creativity and 
innovation, thereby improving the team's overall productivity. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 3: A granted US-CN patent with more cross-national inventors leads to 
more subsequent innovation adoption (captured by its forward citations). 
 
2.5 Multinational Assignees 
First, according to ‘capabilities theory of the firm’ (Dunning, 1997; Kuemmerle, 
1997), Firms are becoming increasingly dependent on their ability to establish a 
presence at an increasing number of locations to access new knowledge and 
capabilities. As a consequence, in an increasing number of cases, firms will invest in 
R&D abroad not so much to exploit their existing competitive advantages, but to gain 
new advantages or complementary assets which help sustain or further their global 
competitive competencies. China and other emerging economies possess a growing 
pool of human capital potentially valuable for R&D. According to the Boston 
Consulting Group (2005), China, India, and Russia will likely provide more than two 
million new scientists and engineers per year by 2010. Moreover, the R&D conducted 
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in these countries often exceeds that required for localization or government-enforced 
technology transfers. For example, GE Medical Services integrates technologies from 
its labs in China, Israel, Hungary, France, and India into everything from new X-ray 
devices to million dollar CT scanners (Engardio, 2003).  
Second, Economic growth worldwide is highly dependent on international 
diffusion of knowledge (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991). However, 
knowledge is often tacit and not easy to transmit as blueprints (Polanyi, 1967; Nelson 
and Winter, 1982). This can cause knowledge diffusion to be geographically localized, 
an argument supported by numerous empirical studies (Jaffe, 1993; Audretsch and 
Feldman, 1996; Branstetter, 2001; Keller, 2002). Cross-national research 
collaboration may help to break this obstacle of geographical knowledge division and 
thus promotes the growth of technological innovation. On the other hand, Trajtenberg 
(1997) argue that more original research, as well as research that draws from far 
removed technological areas, lead to innovations of wider technological applicability. 
More reliance on scientific resources also enhances the generality of outcomes. 
Taking the above two factors into account, we may infer a patent developed by 
multinational assignees probably have higher ‘quality’. Similarly, as an important 
patent signal, a granted US-CN patent with multinational assignees will lead to more 
follow-on innovations to build on it. Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 4: A granted US-CN patent with more multinational assignees leads to 
more subsequent innovation adoption (captured by its forward citations). 
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2.6 Strength of IPR Regime 
There is a rich stream of the studies on the strength of external IPR institutions 
and their impact on innovation. Under the prospect theory (Kitch, 1977), a stronger 
patent system gives pioneers incentives to commercialize and organize the market 
better for follow-on innovation (via licensing). Zhao (2006) argues that weak external 
IPR proection leads to low returns to innovation and underutilization of innovative 
talents and more internalization of firm R&D activities. In a more recent study, Huang 
(2009) finds the reduction of uncertainties in IPR conditions, specifically patent 
enforcement uncertainty and patent market value uncertainty, negatively impacts (by 
over 20%) the production and accumulation of follow-on knowledge within 
innovative firms and organizations. In other words, an increase in IPR certainty 
enhances externalization of firm knowledge activities (through mechanisms such as 
out-licensing). According to Mansfield (1994), perceptions of strong IP rights abroad 
had a positive effect on incentives to transfer technologies abroad.  
The standard argument for why innovation may be positively stimulated under a 
strong patent protection in developed countries is that stronger patent rights increase 
the degree of appropriability of the returns to innovation (Landes and Posner, 2003; 
Scotchmer, 2004; Allred and Park, 2007). Considering developing countries, we see 
that innovation is likely to be positively influenced by knowledge disclosures from 
patents and the appropriability effect of patent protection (Siebeck, 1990). Ordover 
(1991) argues that protection of intellectual property through strong patent laws is 
taken as a reflection of broader social concerns for long-run growth and technological 
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progress. Appropriately structured patent law and antitrust rules can together ensure 
incentives for R&D and also induce cooperation among firms in diffusing R&D 
results through licensing and other means. 
Sherwood (1997) conducted case studies for 18 developing countries and 
concluded that poor provision of intellectual property rights deters local innovation 
and risk-taking. In cross-country studies, several works find a positive influence 
overall of patent protection on trade, FDI, and licensing (Maskus and Penubarti, 1995; 
Smith, 2001; Yang and Maskus, 2001; Branstetter, 2004; Park and Lippoldt, 2005; 
Gans, Hsu and Stern, 2008). 
Based on the rich literature, we can infer that under a strong IPR regime, patent 
‘signaling’ effect will be bigger. Thus, I predict H5: 
 
Hypothesis 5a: The signaling effect of the number of patent claims on the forward 
citations of the granted US-CN patent will be stronger if the focal patent is developed 
under a strong IPR regime versus a weak one. 
 
Hypothesis 5b: The signaling effect of the number of patent classes on the forward 
citations of the granted US-CN patent will be stronger if the focal patent is developed 
under a strong IPR regime versus a weak one. 
 
2.7 An Illustration 
The impact of a US-CN patent characteristics as signals on the growth of 
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follow-on innovation is displayed in Figure 1. As illustrated, if a patent is first 
filed in China and then subsequently grant in US, its characteristics of patent 
scope, patent strength, cross-national inventors and multinational assignees will 
have a moderating effect on the forward citation of the patent subsequently grant 
in US. What is more, this moderating effect will also vary under different strength 
of external IPR regime. 
 
Figure 1   Relationship of US-CN Patent Characters and Its Impact on Forward Citations 
 
Patent first filed in China 
Patent Subsequently grant in US (with Chinese priority) 
Patent strength 
Patent scope 
Cross-national inventors 
Mutinational Assignees 
Forward Citation 
 
 
Strength of External IPR Regime 
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3. Data, Sample and Measures 
To test these hypotheses, an empirical strategy is needed to show the above 
signaling effects of the US-CN patents. I therefore construct a longitudinal dataset 
based on 4490 patent match pairs from both SIPO and USPTO to analyze its overall 
impact. Furthermore, for robustness check, I conduct a subsample empirical analysis 
within 853 patents where at least one of the patent assignees is an IPO firm.  
 
3.1 Sample design and data gathering 
One of the contributions `of this paper is its focus on the impact of patented 
innovation from developing country on the technology development in developed 
countries. Thus, the US granted patents with Chinese priority are favorable in that 1) 
The US patent system provides the world most complete and accurate patent data 
information. 2) The Chinese filing in US is increasing rapidly in recent years and 
contributes a great part (the 7th biggest) of the world overseas patenting activities.  
To obtain the US and Chinese patent match pairs, I first downloaded the entire 
population of 6236 US grant patents3 with at least a Chinese priority from Delphion 
Database. In patent law, a priority is a legally enforceable and officially conferred 
status after stringent examination that establishes the first novelty (or filing) of a 
patented invention. The priority right belongs to the applicant or his successor in title 
and allows him to file a subsequent application in another country for the same 
invention, design or trademark and benefit, for this subsequent application, from the 
                                                        
3 Inclusive of all data until November 6th, 2008  
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date of filing of the first application for the examination of certain requirements. 
When filing the subsequent application, the applicant must "claim the priority" of 
the first application in order to make use of the right of priority. As design patents do 
contain substantial creative and technological research capability (and are therefore 
not within the scope of this study), I have excluded all 1300 of them leaving only 
4936 inventions and utilities model patents which contains real innovative work. The 
USPTO database contains useful information including Title, National Class, 
Publication Number, Number of Claims, Assignee Name, Assignee Country, USPTO 
Assignee Code, Application Number, Application Date, Number of Forward 
References, Inventor Name, Inventor Country, and Priority Number. Second, 
according to the ‘priority number’ in USPTO, I identified an earliest Chinese priority 
of this US grant focal patent as its origin. Necessary information of this corresponding 
earliest Chinese priority can be manually matched and checked in the SIPO website 
using fields such as titles, abstract, application date, inventor names, inventor 
countries, grant date and grant publication date, etc. After excluding missing and 
incomplete entries, we ended up with 4543 successful matched pairs. Lastly, we 
excluded those US focal patents whose application date in US is earlier than the one 
in China as this study focuses only on patented innovations first filed and developed 
in China. The final data set contains only 4490 US-CN matched patents. 
We got IPO firm’s financial data such as assets, R&D and sales from Compustat. 
Among the 4490 US-CN matched patents, 853 of are IPO firms and have their 
financial records in Compustat. Thus, combining with these firm’s financial data, I 
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conduct the second subsample robustness check. 
 
3.2 Measures and Variables 
3.2.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, nFC, is the number of forward citations of the US focal 
patents. It is a measure of the growth of follow-on innovation 
 
3.2.2 Independent Variable 
I construct four independent variables as measures of patent signals, namely, 
nclaim, nclass, ncountry, and ninvencoun. Nclaim is number of patent claim. It is a 
measure of patent strength. Nclass is the number of national class4 of the US focal 
patent. It is a measure of patent scope. Ninvencoun is the number of different 
countries in inventor countries. It is a measure of cross-national inventor. Last, 
Ncountry is the number of different countries in assignee countries. It is a measure of 
multinational assignees. 
In addition, in order to test H5, I construct 4 interaction effects to examine the effect 
of patent claims and patent class on forward citations under different patent regime 
strength 5 , namely, nonUSiprstrongclaim, nonUSiprstrongclass, USiprstrongclaim, 
USiprstrongclass: 
(i) nonUSiprstrongclaim=mainnonUSiprstrong * number of claim 
(ii) nonUSiprstrongclass’ = mainnonUSiprstrong * number of class  
                                                        
4 National class is based on USPTO patent classification regime.  
5 For classification of weak and strong IPR regime environment please refer to Mingyuan Zhao (2006). 
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(iii) USiprstrongclaim’ = mainUSiprstrong * number of claim  
(iv) USiprstrongclass’= mainUSiprstrong * number of class 
Thereinto, MainnonUSiprstrong stands for if half or more than 50% inventors are 
from Non-US IPR strong countries. If yes, then it equals to 1. Otherwise equals to 0. 
MainUSiprstrong is also a dummy variables standing for if half or more than 50% 
inventors are from US. If yes, then it equals to 1. Otherwise it equals to 0. Using the 
criteria from previous empirical studies (e.g. Zhao, 2006), if 50% or more of a 
patent’s inventors are from strong IPR countries, then the patent is considered to have 
been developed in strong IPR countries. Thus MainnonUSiprstrong and 
MainUSiprstrong can be viewed as an indicator of the strength of IPR regime under 
which the US-CN patent is developed. 
By conducting interaction variable ‘nonUSiprstrongclaim’ equals to 
mainnonUSiprstrong * number of claim, I try to examine whether the effect of nclaim 
is stronger when most inventors of this US focal patent are from non-US IPR strong 
countries (developed by non-US IPR strong countries). If half or more than 50% 
inventors are from non-US IPR strongcountries, it equals to nclaim, otherwise it 
equals to 0. In this way we manage to capture only the nclaim information of a patent 
at least 50% of whose inventors are from non-US IPR strongcountries. And also we 
can compare its effect of nclaim on forward citations with those less than 50% of 
whose inventors are from non-US IPR strongcountries. Similar with interaction 
variable ‘nonUSiprstrongclaim’, by multiplying ‘mainnonUSiprstrong’ and ‘nclass’, 
we can measure whether the effect of nclass is stronger when most inventors of this 
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US focal patent are from non-US IPR strong countries (developed by non-US IPR 
strong countries). If half or more than 50% inventors are from non-US IPR 
strongcountries, it equals to nclass, otherwise it equals to 0. 
In the same way, by conducting interaction variable ‘USiprstrongclaim’ equals 
tomainUSiprstrong *nclaim, I try to examine whether the effect of nclaim is stronger 
when most inventors of this US focal patent are from US (developed by US). If half 
or more than 50% inventors are from US, it equals to nclaim, otherwise it equals to 0. 
Similar with interaction variable ‘USiprstrongclass’, by multiplying 
‘mainUSiprstrong’ and ‘nclass’, we can measure whether the effect of nclass is 
stronger when most inventors of this US focal patent are from US (developed by US). 
If half or more than 50% inventors are from US, it equals to nclass, otherwise it 
equals to 0. 
 
3.2.3 Control Variables 
“Chemistryindustry” is a dummy variable to control for the industry fixed effect. 
If the US focal patent belongs to chemistry, then it is coded as 1. Industries vary 
widely in their propensity to patent and in the usefulness of patents as a measure of 
innovative activities (Cohen, 2000). Arrow (1962) points out that in chemicals, the 
industries where patents are most important, one would expect the more 
R&D-intensive firms to regard patents as much more important than the less 
R&D-intensive firms because their inventions are more likely than those of the less 
R&D-intensive firms to be of the type that patents are relatively effective in 
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protecting. 
To control the patent assignee effect, I construct variables USPTOAssignee, 
Ndelphion, assets, R&D, sales and at least1corp. USPTOAssignee is coded as 
different integers for different assignees. It is used to control for assignee fixed effects 
because different assignee may have different impact on their patent’s forward 
citations due to their reputation, asset, competition capabilities, etc. Ndelphion is used 
to control for the organization’s research capability. The more patents of an 
organization got grant in Delphion, the stronger is its research capability. Atleast1corp 
stands for at least one assignee is a company. As firms and non-firms may have 
different attitude and behaviors towards patent, it’s better to control for this firm fixed 
effect. Asset, R_d, sales is employed to control for firm size and spending on R&D. 
Because according to empirical evidence from Germany—company size matters, both 
for the importance of instruments and the motives to patent (Blind, Edler, Frietsch, 
and Schmoch, 2006). 
As controls of inventor features, I employ variables keycninven and keyusinven. 
Keycninven is a dummy variable standing for ‘half or more than 50% China in 
inventor countries’. This variable indicates the main entities that create this focal US 
patent. If it equals to 1, then we know that this US focal patent is mostly innovated by 
Chinese inventors. It will inherit large part of characters of a Chinese created patent. 
Otherwise it equals to 0. Keyusinven is a dummy variable defined similarly as 
Keycninven. If it equals to 1, this US focal patent is mostly innovated by US 
inventors. Otherwise it equals to 0. 
 20
Finally, to control for patent’s origin place, I use variables firstpriorCN, firstprior, 
mainnonUSiprweak, mainnonUSiprstrong, mainUSiprstrong. USFirstpriorCN is a 
dummy variable measuring the source of the US focal patent. If the first priority of the 
US focal patent is in China (value equals to 1), then it means that this US patent is 
first created by China. It is a Chinese invention in nature. Otherwise it equals to 0. 
FirstpriorUS is similar to FirstpriorCN. If the first priority of the US focal patent is in 
US (value equals to 1), then it means that this US patent is first created by US. It is a 
Chinese invention in nature. Otherwise it equals to 0. MainnonUSiprweak is a dummy 
variable standing for if half or more than 50% inventors are from Non-US IPR weak 
countries. If yes, then it equals to 1. Otherwise it equals to 0. MainnonUSiprstrong 
and mainUSiprstrong is of the same definition as previously mentioned. They together 
control the IPR source and environment of the US focal patent under which it is 
developed. 
 
3.2.4 Year Dummies 
I employ the application date and grant or grant publication date of the matched 
Chinese priority as a time control. A1 to A23 indicate dummy variables1985-2007, 
which is application year of the Chinese priority match, while G1 to G23 are dummy 
variables 1986-2007 or 0. It stands for grantorgrantpub year of the Chinese priority 
match. It equals to grantpubyear of the Chinese priority (If grantpubyear is missing in 
SIPO, then it is coded as grantyear of the Chinese priority.). If Gi drops within 
1986-2007, it means that the priority of this US focal patent is granted in China in 
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year Gi . If Gi=0, it means that this patent has not been grant yet in China 
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
Table 1 to Table 3 below provide the summary statistics of key variables. The 
mean of ‘nFC’ (number of forward citation) of the focal US patent is 2.54 in the full 
sample (Table 1) and 2.12 (Table 2) in the sub-sample of only IPO firms. After 
grouping the full sample by ‘keycninven’(whether half or more than 50% inventors 
are from China, we can find that nFC of patents with half or more than 50% Chinese 
inventors (keycninven=1) are smaller than those with fewer Chinese inventores 
(keycninven=0), both in the full sample in Table 1-1 (2.15 versus 2.82) and in the 
sub-sample in Table 2-1 (1.90 versus 2.15). However, on the other hand, nclaim and 
nclass of patents with half or more than 50% Chinese inventors (keycninven=1) are 
bigger than those with fewer Chinese inventores (keycninven=0), both in the full 
sample in Table 1-1 (12.57 versus 12.35; 4.06 versus 3.77) and in the sub-sample in 
Table 2-1 (15.26 versus 13.43; 5.57 versus 3.31). 
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Table 1    Sample Statistics of Key Variables (Full Sample) 
N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Variable 
4490 2.542984 7.580418 0 235 nFC 
4490 12.44744 8.344259 1 91 Nclaim 
4490 0.130735 0.337148 0 1 Chemistryindustry 
4090 1.093399 0.291026 1 2 Ncountry 
4490 3.897105 2.876939 1 32 Nclass 
4490 1.091982 0.298885 1 3 Ninvencoun 
3322 2492.09 18703.22 1 610884 Ndelphion 
4490 0.418486 0.493366 0 1 Keycninven 
4490 0.089087 0.284901 0 1 Keyusinven 
4490 0.729399 0.44432 0 1 mainnonUSiprweak 
4490 0.103341 0.304437 0 1 mainnonUSiprstrong 
4490 0.063252 0.243442 0 1 mainUSiprstrong 
4490 0.69265 0.461447 0 1 atleast1corp 
4490 0.850111 0.357002 0 1 firstpriorCN 
4490 0.127394 0.333451 0 1 firstpriorUS 
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Table 1-1    Summary Statistics Grouped by Keycninven (Full Sample) 
Keycninven=0 keycninven=1 
N Mean Std Dev Min Max N Mean Std Dev Min MaximumVariable 
2611 2.820375 7.107299 0 187 1879 2.157531 8.178955 0 235 nFC 
2611 12.35236 8.737768 1 87 1879 12.57956 7.764775 1 91 Nclaim 
2611 0.113367 0.317101 0 1 1879 0.15487 0.361877 0 1 chemistryindustry 
2211 1.005427 0.073487 1 2 1879 1.196913 0.397772 1 2 Ncountry 
2611 3.779012 2.803493 1 28 1879 4.061203 2.968952 1 32 Nclass 
2611 1.081578 0.2834 1 3 1879 1.10644 0.31867 1 3 Ninvencoun 
1883 4010.86 21085.96 1 610884 1439 504.7123 14798.68 1 558409 Ndelphion 
2611 0 0 0 0 1879 1 0 1 1 Keycninven 
2611 0.1509 0.35802 0 1 1879 0.003193 0.056433 0 1 Keyusinven 
2611 0.534661 0.498893 0 1 1879 1 0 1 1 mainnonUSiprweak 
mainnonUSiprstrong 2611 0.163156 0.369579 0 1 1879 0.020224 0.140802 0 1 
2611 0.104941 0.306536 0 1 1879 0.005322 0.072777 0 1 mainUSiprstrong 
2611 0.738031 0.43979 0 1 1879 0.62959 0.483043 0 1 Atleast1corp 
2611 0.749904 0.433151 0 1 1879 0.989356 0.102646 0 1 firstpriorCN 
2611 0.214094 0.410271 0 1 1879 0.006919 0.082912 0 1 firstpriorUS 
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Table 2    Summary Statistics of Key Variables (Sub-Sample) 
N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Variable 
864 2.121528 8.537033 0 187 nFC 
864 13.69329 6.855378 1 63 Nclaim 
864 0.09375 0.291649 0 1 Chemistryindustry 
863 1.00927 0.095889 1 2 Ncountry 
864 3.636574 2.886795 1 32 Nclass 
864 1.119213 0.331297 1 3 Ninvencoun 
864 5765.58 22144.8 1 567905 Ndelphion 
864 0.142361 0.349623 0 1 Keycninven 
864 0.087963 0.283405 0 1 Keyusinven 
864 0.824074 0.380978 0 1 mainnonUSiprweak 
864 0.086806 0.281713 0 1 mainnonUSiprstrong 
864 0.065972 0.248377 0 1 mainUSiprstrong 
864 21163714 26749181 0 135000000 Asset 
575 906918.2 1633074 0 6015000 R_d 
859 31930754 25824643 0 109000000 Sales 
864 0.887732 0.315879 0 1 firstpriorCN 
864 0.097222 0.296432 0 1 firstpriorUS 
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Table 2-1    Summary Statistic Grouped by Keyciniven (Sub-Sample) 
Keycninven=0 keycninven=1 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
nFC 741 2.157895 9.080312 0 187 123 1.902439 3.920134 0 22 
Nclaim 741 13.4332 6.71283 1 63 123 15.26016 7.498456 1 39 
Chemistryindustry 741 0.076923 0.266649 0 1 123 0.195122 0.397915 0 1 
Ncountry 740 1.001351 0.036761 1 2 123 1.056911 0.232619 1 2 
Nclass 741 3.31444 2.42502 1 19 123 5.577236 4.341957 1 32 
Ninvencoun 741 1.133603 0.348303 1 3 123 1.03252 0.178103 1 2 
Ndelphion 741 6621.47 23763.75 1 567905 123 609.4065 3513.29 1 24893 
Keycninven 741 0 0 0 0 123 1 0 1 1 
Keyusinven 741 0.102564 0.303594 0 1 123 0 0 0 0 
mainnonUSiprweak 741 0.794872 0.404068 0 1 123 1 0 1 1 
mainnonUSiprstrong 741 0.101215 0.301816 0 1 123 0 0 0 0 
mainUSiprstrong 741 0.076923 0.266649 0 1 123 0 0 0 0 
Asset 741 22820331 26391315 0 135000000 123 11183611 26826221 0 1.32E+08
R_d 494 1034938 1720595 0 6015000 81 126158.5 416004.8 0 3644672
Sales 736 35773107 24157731 0 109000000 123 8939109 23501275 0 1.06E+08
firstpriorCN 741 0.871795 0.334544 0 1 123 0.98374 0.126992 0 1 
firstpriorUS 741 0.112011 0.315593 0 1 123 0.00813 0.090167 0 1 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
   Table 3   Correlation Matrix of Key Variables 
 
       
1 n  FC 1                   
2 Ncla  im 21 10.06                    
3 Chemistryindustry 0.0374 0.0591 1                 
4 Ncoun  try 41 1-0.08  14 0.1139 -0.07                
5 Nclass 0.0892 0.0967 0.2132 0.0042 1               
6 Ninvencoun -0.027 0.1286 -0.0287 0.3557 0.0141 1              
7 Ndelphion -0.0095 0.0107 -0.0171 -0.0396 -0.012 0.0041 1             
8 Keycninven -0.0431 0.0134 0.0607 0.3279 0.0484 0.041 -0.0929 1            
9 Keyusinven 0.0913 0.1959 0.0318 -0.0717 0.0664 0.0973 0.1035 -0.2558 1           
10 mainnonUSiprweak -0.0418 -0.0655 -0.0151 0.1496 -0.0404 0.0046 -0.1192 0.5167 -0.4994 1          
11 mainnonUSiprstrong 0.0232 0.0006 0.0116 -0.0035 0.0124 0.0302 0.0511 -0.2316 -0.1062 -0.4898 1         
12 mainUSiprstrong 0.1095 0.1568 0.0376 -0.0625 0.0672 0.1374 0.005 -0.2019 0.5708 -0.3195 -0.0672 1        
13 atleast1corp -0.1176 0.1495 -0.0567 0.1842 -0.0096 0.155 0.0449 -0.1159 0.0863 -0.0363 0.1564 0.0026 1       
14 Asset -0.0458 -0.0186 -0.0612 0.0754 -0.0108 0.0379 0.4269 -0.152 0.4996 -0.5249 0.1975 -0.0041 . 1      
15 r_d -0.0276 0.0288 -0.0223 -0.0002 0.0039 0.0314 0.4669 -0.1953 0.6353 -0.6454 0.1935 0.0059 . 0.9657 1     
16 Sales -0.1599 -0.0403 -0.1451 0.0724 -0.1695 0.072 0.3479 -0.3663 0.303 -0.2427 0.0141 0.0039 . 0.8622 0.8843 1    
17 firstpriorCN -0.1076 0.0093 -0.05 0.1245 -0.0723 0.0499 -0.0061 0.3309 -0.1534 0.3889 -0.4703 -0.1831 -0.0674 -0.0028 0.0009 0.1908 1   
18 firstpriorUS 0.1086 -0.017 0.046 -0.1125 0.0785 -0.0528 0.0086 -0.3065 0.1666 -0.3717 0.4518 0.2026 0.0649 0.0162 0.006 -0.1784 -0.91 1  
19 USPTOassignee -0.1225 0.14 -0.0235 0.2207 -0.0119 0.1621 -0.0944 0.1501 -0.0464 0.3208 -0.0098 -0.0746 0.6049 -0.2352 -0.3419 0.037 0.1068 -0.0987 1 
    From the above summary statistics we can see several interesting phenomenon. 
In the full sample of 4490 entries, table 1-1, first, when most of its inventors are from 
China (keycninven=1), judging from the mean value, a US focal patent tends to have 
more claims (12.57956) and classes (4.061203) compared to those (claims12.35236, 
class 3.779012) when most of its inventors are not from China (keycninven=0). 
Similarly, the ncountry and ninvencoun of the former (1.196913 and 1.10644) are 
more than the latter (1.005427 and 1.081578). However, the forward citations of the 
former (2.157531) are less than the latter (2.820375). This seems contradictory with 
our prediction. Second, judging from the mean of Ndelphion, we can see that when 
most of its inventors come from China, a US focal patent’s assignee tend to have 
much fewer grant patents (504.7123) in delphion compared to those (4010.86) with 
mainly non-Chinese inventors. This also reveals that our Chinese original innovation 
just takes up a relatively low proportion in Delphion. Third, judging from table 1, 
firstpriorCN, we find that most of these US-CN patents have a Chinese priority earlier 
than any other country’s priority. This proves the creativity and research capability of 
our Chinese inventors. Most of those US-CN patents have a Chinese origin. This 
further proves the China contribution to the world’s growth of technological 
innovation. 
    In the subsample of 853 entries with financial data of IPO firms, similar 
phenomenon is found. In table 2-2, first, when most of its inventors are from China 
(keycninven=1), judging from the mean value, a US focal patent tends to have more 
claims (15.26016) and classes (5.577236) compared to those (claims14.4332, class 
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3.31444) when most of its inventors are not from China (keycninven=0). Similarly, 
the ncountry of the former (1.056911) are more than the latter (1.001351). However, 
the forward citations of the former (1.902439) are less than the latter (2.157895). This 
seems contradictory with our prediction. Second, judging from the mean of Ndelphion, 
we can see that when most of its inventors come from China, a US focal patent’s 
assignee firm tends to have much fewer grant patents (609.4065) in delphion 
compared to those (6621.47) with mainly non-Chinese inventors. This also reveals 
that our Chinese original innovation just takes up a relatively low proportion in 
Delphion. On the other hand, as IPO firms average grant patents in delphion are 
relatively more than all organization’s average, we can see that IPO firms tend to use 
the cross-national patenting activities as a strategy more frequently than any other 
forms of organizations. Third, judging from table 1, firstpriorCN, we also find that 
most of these US-CN patents have a Chinese priority earlier than any other country’s 
priority. At last, as the average assets (11183611) of the IPO firms when keycninven 
equals to 1 is much fewer than those (22820331) of keycninven=0, we can infer that 
the IPO firms behind a Chinese innovation is relatively smaller. 
According to the correlation matrix Table 3, most of our key variables are 
unrelated (with correlation less than 0.5) except for only a few pairs. However, those 
related variable pairs are reasonable and thus allowable. For example, variable ‘asset’, 
‘r_d’ and ‘sales’ are highly correlated. Especially ‘asset’ and ‘r_d’ has a correlation as 
high as 0.9657. However, this correlation is explainable. According to commen sense, 
if a company has more assets, which means it is relatively bigger than other firms. 
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Thus, it has the capability and tends to invest more in R&D spending. So these two 
variables are likely to be correlated. To set another example, ‘mainnonUSiprweak’ is 
highly related with variable ‘keycninven’ with a correlation number 0.5167. This is 
quite straightforward. If a patent is developed mainly by Chinese inventors, the 
probability is high that half or more than 50% of its inventors are from Non-US IPR 
weak country, namely, China. 
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4. Methods and Empirical Approach  
4.1 Regression Model 
As the dependent variables—number of forward citations is a positive integer, I 
employ a Negative Binomial Model for regression (NBRM).  
Our dependent variable is number of forward citations. It is total count of all 
citations of a US focal patent by November 6th, 2008. Using citation data requires us to 
build our estimations around a count data model. Our approach is to look at the impact of 
certain ‘patent signal’ on subsequent innovation adoption (captured by its forward 
citations). Our citation data is highly right skewed (with skewness of 13.73) and the 
dependent variable, numbe of forward citations (nFC) exhibits overdispersion where the 
variance (7.58, see Table 1) is significantly larger than the mean (2.54, see Table 1). 
Therefore the negative binomial regression model (NBRM) is preferred over the 
common poisson model to accommodate such underlying probability distribution 
(Hausman, Hall and Griliches, 1984). 
Judging from the regression results, if the coefficient of nclaim, nclass, ncountry, 
ninvencoun ‘nonUSiprstrongclaim’, ‘nonUSiprstrongclass’, and ‘USiprstrongclass’ are 
all positive and significant, then hypothesis 1—5 will be supported. 
I first conducted a full sample regression with 4490 data entries. Then I did a 
subsample regression with 853 data entries for the following reasons: 1) Those 853 
patents are all filled by IPO firms. We can easily get their firm’s financial data such as 
assets, R&D spending and sales and add them as firm’s specific controls. Thus, in 
spite of the smaller sample size of 853, the regression result may be more accurate 
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and persuadable because it excludes additional ‘noise’ caused by firms’ different 
attributes. Second, by focusing the same situation in purely IPO firms, it may provide 
us new knowledge of IPO firm’s insights. Even if the result is the same as that in the 
full sample, we can treat this subsample regression as a robustness check. It further 
proves that the impact of US-CN patents’ certain character on the growth of 
innovation in US is probably consistent regardless of different forms of organizations.  
 
4.2 Regression Table 
Table 3 below describes the empirical result of full sample (4490 data entries) 
regression. Model (1) is the baseline models which include only control variables 
while Model (2) is the regression included only independent variables. Model (3) 
indicates the full model after combining all IVs and control variables. Model (4) and 
(5) is aim to test some interaction effects, namely ‘nonUSiprstrongclaim’, 
‘nonUSiprstrongclass’,  ‘USiprstrongclaim’ and ‘USiprstrongclass’ . 
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Table 3    Full Sample Regression 
Dependent Variable: 
Number of Forward 
Citations 
Baseline  
（1） 
Independent 
Variables 
（2） 
Full 
(3)=（1）+ (2)
Add  
Patent Claim 
interaction 
（4） 
Add 
Patent Class 
Interaction 
（5） 
Independent Variables 
Nclaim  .0145376*** .0186376*** 0.018551*** 0.0186711*** 
Ncountry  -1.531209*** .3133753* 0.308144 0.3050794 
Nclass  .0749975*** .0347009*** 0.034415*** 0.0528426*** 
Ninvencoun  -.0984641 .41247*** 0.427552*** 0.4010068*** 
Interaction Variables 
nonUSiprstrongclaim(4)    0.0134656  
USiprstrongclaim(4)    -0.009718 - 
nonUSiprstrongclass(5)     -0.0674476* 
USiprstrongclass(5)     -0.064377* 
Control Variables  
Chemistryindustry  -.0114388 -.2040508* -0.19906* -0.1873072* 
USPTOAssignee -9.58e-08  .0001551 -1.11e-07 -1.17E-07 
Ndelphion -8.30e-06  -9.55e-06 -1E-05* -9.62E-06 
Keycninven -.6867168***  -.8568543*** -0.86112*** -0.8697776*** 
Keyusinven .6432041*  -.1269969 -0.17738 -0.064098 
mainnonUSiprweak .6458043*  .0679365 -0.00811 0.097532 
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mainnonUSiprstrong .3519242  -.2429415 -0.48256 0.0466959 
mainUSiprstrong .2207252  .098167 0.255072 0.3526089 
Atleast1corp .0831064  .0264358 0.025795 0.0390372 
firstpriorCN -.3820231  -.2270706 -0.1876 -0.2927618 
firstpriorUS -.199451  -.0442815 0.004897 -0.1123046 
Year Dummies 
A1-A23 (included) Included Included Included Included Included 
G1-G23 (included) Included Included Included Included Included 
Regression Statistics 
Log-likelihood -4577.2358 -7657.9528 -4527.5064 -4525.9463 -4522.756 
Pseudo R2 0.1316 0.0126 0.1383 0.1386 0.1392 
P 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of Obsevations  3029 4090 3017 3017 3017 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001  
 
Table 4 below describes the empirical result of sub-sample (853 data entries) 
regression. Model (1) is the baseline models which include only control variables while 
Model (2) is the regression included only independent variables. Model (3) indicates the 
full model after combining all IVs and control variables. Model (4) is based on Model (3) 
while adds firm’s financial data as assets, R&D and sales. Similar with the full sample 
regression, Model (5) and (6) is aim to test some interaction effects, namely 
‘nonUSiprstrongclaim’, ‘nonUSiprstrongclass’, ‘USiprstrongclaim’, ‘USiprstrongclass’. 
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Table 4    Sub-Sample Regression 
Dependent Variable: 
Number of Forward 
Citations 
Independent 
Variables 
（2） 
Full 
(3)=（1）+ (2)
(3) Add  
firm’s 
financial 
data=(4) 
Add  
Patent Claim 
interaction 
（5） 
Add  
Patent class 
Interaction 
（6） 
Independent Variables 
Nclaim .0145376*** 0.0147861 0.0126996 0.0006594 0.0129583 
Ncountry -1.531209*** 1.270059* 1.665167** 1.641496* 1.635694* 
Nclass .0749975*** 0.0629551** 0.071393*** 7.65E-02*** 6.26E-02** 
Ninvencoun -.0984641 0.4877271** 0.39282* 0.4474824** 0.4034156* 
Interaction Variables 
nonUSiprstrongclaim(5)    0.0807492**  
USiprstrongclaim(6)    -0.010766  
nonUSiprstrongclass(6)     0.0181197 
USiprstrongclass(6)     0.0805196 
Control Variables 
Chemistryindustry -.0114388 0.545731** 0.594692** 0.5780225** 0.5665204**
USPTOAssignee  -2.66e-07 -4.08e-07 -3.64E-07 -3.56E-07 
Ndelphion  -8.56E-06 -0.0000168 -0.0000209 -0.0000171 
Keycninven  -9.92E-01*** -1.347236*** -1.265247*** -1.330449***
Keyusinven  (dropped) -0.5612514 1.353451** -0.5989769 
mainnonUSiprweak  0.4511454 (dropped) 1.799321*** (dropped) 
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mainnonUSiprstrong  -0.2029056 -0.8426635** (dropped) -0.9183705*
mainUSiprstrong  -0.3673073 -0.2460491 -0.2576754 -0.5996845 
Atleast1corp  (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 
firstpriorCN  -0.0325483 0.1261482 0.064596 0.137508 
firstpriorUS  -0.1930161 -0.3484976 -0.2495466 -0.3591301 
Asset   2.99E-08** 2.35E-08* 2.92E-08* 
R_d   -3.03E-07 -1.76E-07 -2.93E-07 
Control Variables 
Sales   -1.36E-08 -1.36E-08 -1.29E-08 
Year Dummies 
A1-A23 Included Included Included Included Included 
G1-G23 Included Included Included Included Included 
Regression Statistics 
Log-likelihood -7657.9528 -1050.1459 -907.86688 -902.35465 -907.15749 
Pseudo R2 0.0126 0.1958 0.1687 0.1737 0.1693 
P 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of Obsevations 863   786 541 541 541 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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5. Results 
 
5.1 Full Sample Regression 
5.1.1 Independent Variables 
In the full sample regression in table 3, Model (3) is the full model. Judging from 
Model (3), we find that all the coefficients of the four independent variables in H1 to 
H4, nclaim, nclass, ncountry, ninvencoun are positive and significant, thus H1 to H4 
are all supported.  
From Table 3 we see that the coefficient of ‘nclaim’ in full model (3) is 
0.0186376>0 and significant (p=.000). Therefore, a granted US-CN patent with more 
claims leads to more subsequent innovation adoption (captured by its forward 
citations). Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
The coefficient of ‘nclass’ in full model (3) 0.037009 is also positive and 
significant with p=0.001. Thus, a granted US-CN patent with broader patent classes 
leads to more subsequent innovation adoption (captured by its forward citations). 
Hypothesis 2 is supported. 
The coefficient of ‘ninvencoun’ in full model (3) equals to 0.41247, positive and 
and significant with p=0.000. It proves that a granted US-CN patent with more 
cross-national inventors leads to more subsequent innovation adoption (captured by 
its forward citations). Hypothesis 3 is supported. 
Similarly, the coefficient of ‘ncountry’ in full model (3) equals to .3133753>0 
and significant at p=0.049. So, a granted US-CN patent with more multinational 
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assignees leads to more subsequent innovation adoption (captured by its forward 
citations). Hypothesis 4 is supported. 
However, the coefficients of “nonUSiprstrongclaim” and “USiprstrongclaim” in 
model (4) equal to 0.0134656 and -0.009718 but not significant (with p values equal 
to 0.221 and 0.304 respectively).Thus, Hypothesis 5a: “The signaling effect of the 
number of patent claims on the forward citations of the granted US-CN patent will be 
stronger if the focal patent is developed under a strong IPR regime versus a weak 
one” is not supported.  
Similarly, the coefficients of “nonUSiprstrongclass” and “USiprstrongclass” in 
model (5) equal to -0674476 and -0.064377 respectively. Although they are both 
significant at p=0.024 and p=0.014, they are negative value which is not as positive as 
predicted in Hypothessis 5(b). Thus, Hypothesis 5b: ‘The signaling effect of the 
number of patent classes on the forward citations of the granted US-CN patent will be 
stronger if the focal patent is developed under a strong IPR regime versus a weak 
one’ is not supported either.  
For hypothesis 5(b), “nonUSiprstrongclass” and “USiprstrongclass” are 
significant but negatively related to patent forward citations. This may suggest that for 
patents mainly from IPR strong countries, nclass has a smaller positive effect on its 
forward citations compared to IPR weak countries. One of the plausible explanations 
for this result is that: According to the early patent literature (Arrow, 1962; Nordhaus, 
1969; Scherer, 1972) and more recent work by Grossman and Lai (2004) point out 
that the optimal level of patent protection depends on the characteristics of a 
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technology or market. In general, developing economies produce less radical 
innovations. The smaller the market size and the lower the capacity to innovate, the 
lower the optimal strength of patent protection should be (Grossman and Lai, 2004). 
More direct negative effects of stronger patent protection on innovation may arise 
because developing countries tend to perform adaptive or imitative R&D (Evenson 
and Westphal, 1997). Stronger patents increase the cost of technological inputs and 
reduce their supply, thereby limiting the ability of local agents to learn by imitation or 
learn by doing (Elkan, 1996; Glass, 2004). 
 
5.1.2 Other Findings: Industry Effect 
In the full sample regression, variable ‘chemistryindustry’ is significant but 
negatively related to US-CN patent’s forward citations. This means that, among all 
kinds of organizations in the full sample, if a patent is classified as “chemical patent”, 
then it tends to have fewer forward citations.   
 
5.2 Sub-Sample Regression as a Robustness Check 
5.2.1 Independent Variables 
In the Sub-Sample regression in table 3, Model (4) is the complete model. 
Results from Model (4) suggest that the coefficients of three independent variables 
nclass, ncountry and ninvencoun are positive and significant. Thus, H2 to H4 are all 
supported. However the coefficient of nclaim is not significant anymore (with 
p=0.186). Thus, H1 is not supported. 
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For H5(a) and H5(b), only one of the four interactions is supported. The 
coefficient of ‘nonUSiprstrongclaim’ is significant and positive. Thus, H5 is partially 
supported.  
 
5.2.2 Other Findings 
5.2.2.1 Industry Effect 
In the Sub-sample regression, variable ‘chemistryindustry’ is significant and 
positively related to US-CN patent’s forward citations. This means that, among the 
IPO firms in the sub-sample, if a patent is classified as “chemical patent”, then it 
tends to have fewer forward citations. The difference between full sample regression 
result and sub-sample regression result may suggest that only within the large IPO 
firms, being in the chemical industry actually increases follow-on use and built up of 
innovation which is consistent with previous literature that patenting is critical in only 
a few industries and chemical industry being one of the key ones. 
 
5.2.2.2 Firm Size Effect 
    In the sub-sample regression result, we find a significant and positive 
relationship (2.99E-08) between firm’s assets and its forward citations. This may 
suggest that larger IPO firms tend to attract more follow-on innovation. 
 
5.3 Summary of Empirical Results 
Overall, the full sample empirical result is consistent with the sub-sample 
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empirical result. The sub-sample regression can be viewed as a robustness check of 
the full sample regression. In general, H1 to H4 is all supported except for H5. 
However, failing to support H5 may be due to the special context in developing 
countries. It may be the increasing cost of technological inputs and reduced supply 
caused by stronger patent protection that limits the ability of local agents to learn by 
imitation or learn by doing. 
 
Table 5    Summary Table of the Empirical Results 
Hypothesis Result in Full Sample Result in Sub-Sample No 
H1 Nclaim supported Not supported 
H2 Nclass supported Supported 
H3 Ninvencoun supported Supported 
H4 Ncountry supported Supported 
nonUSiprstrongclaim Not supported Supported 
USiprstrongclaim Not supported Not supported 
nonUSiprstrongclass Not supported Not supported 
H5 
USiprstrongclass Not supported Not supported 
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6. Discussion and Conclusion 
    Various industry reports and media articles repeatedly emphasize that R&D labs 
in emerging economies are integral components of MNEs’ worldwide R&D 
endeavors. Some frameworks have been developed to understand multinational R&D 
in weak IPR countries. However, the technology outflow from developing countries 
to more developed countries has not been fully studied. Usually a developing country 
is under a weak IPR regime while developed countries are often under strong IPR 
regimes. Nowadays, with more developing countries going overseas and seeking for 
technology learning and innovation protection, issues related to cross-national 
strategies of developing countries has drawn more and more attention all over the 
world. What is its impact to our world and what should these developing countries 
pay more attention to? What problems will both the knowledge inflow and outflow 
countries face? Is there any difference between developing countries’ knowledge 
outflow (probably under a weak IPR regime) and developed countries’ knowledge 
outflow (probably under a strong IPR regime)? What is the difference and to what 
extent is this difference?  
Many of these pressing questions beg solutions. Using evidence from Chinese 
patenting activities in US and employing the patent ‘signal theory’, this paper 
attempts to investigate certain characteristics of a Chinese patent subsequently filed 
and granted in U.S. It shed light on the effects of patent signal characteristics on the 
follow-on technological innovation adoption and growth in U.S. Using the 
information of all the “US grant patent with a Chinese priority” (i.e. US-CN patent) 
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derived from USPTO, this paper finds that number of patent claim, number of patent 
class, number of cross-national inventors and number of multinational assignees has a 
significant and positive relationship with its forward citations by follow-on innovation, 
while a patent developed under strong patent regime does not necessarily increase its 
forward citations and technological innovation.  
This finding is inspiring to both management practice and policy application. For 
management practice, as technology outflow from developing countries to developed 
countries is becoming more and more intensified, technology managers, inventors and 
venture capitals have been facing more and more related issues, especially for those 
from developing countries who want to invest or developed their invention overseas 
in a more developed country. This paper gives them useful information on what kind 
of patent will probably attract more continuous research, more follow-on innovation 
and potentially more licensing profit, that is, a patent filed with more claims, more 
class and more cross-national inventors and also invented by mutinational firms. 
These factors, as positive signals, will probably help to increase other people’s 
confidence over the quality of this patent. For policy makers and policy applications, 
this paper also help to shed light on the degree to which they should approve the 
number of class and number of claim of a specific patent, especially when this patent 
is first invented in a developing country and then subesequently grant in a developed 
country. In this way, inventions from developing countries can be better made use of 
and spread all over the world.     
Past literature has explored technology outflow from developed countries to 
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developing countries. However, as developing countries begin to exert their weight on 
the international stage, practitioners and academics are more concerned about a 
framework to understand multinational R&D activities in weak IPR countries. This 
work contributes to our understanding of firm strategies and technology 
competitiveness especially domestic firms and multinational corporations with 
activities across national boundaries. 
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